The Case Against Jury Trials by Lord Sumption ✎

So writes Lord Sumption, in “The case against jury trials” (The Telegraph):

Juries do not give reasons for their verdicts. The drafting of judgments is a demanding task which we cannot reasonably ask juries to perform. They may have up to twelve different reasons. There is a real moral problem about convicting someone of a serious offence without saying why.

This is not just a moral issue. The big problem about jury trials is that we cannot have a proper system of appeals. In Britain, criminal appeals are usually only concerned with the regularity of the trial. Has the judge properly summed up for the jury? Has there been some procedural mishap? Was there any evidence to support the charge? If so, was it legally admissible? The one question which is not asked is whether, assuming that the trial was properly conducted, the jury got the answer right. Yet that is the most important question of all.

Every experienced criminal judge will tell you that juries are careful and conscientious and generally get the answer right. That is true. But inevitably juries sometimes get it badly wrong, especially in really terrible cases such as terrorist murders or sexual interference with children, when they may be too keen to achieve “closure”.

Professional judges can also get the answer badly wrong. They too can sometimes be guided by prejudices, misunderstandings or just plain errors. The difference is that the reasoning of judges is transparent. They give their reasons and their mistakes can be corrected on appeal. By comparison, the reasoning of juries is opaque, and impossible to scrutinise on appeal because we have no idea how they got to their verdict.

All human institutions are fallible. Wrongful convictions and miscarriages of justice do happen. That is why we need a functioning system of appeals to review the merits of criminal convictions and not just the procedural adequacy of the trial. At the moment we do not have one. And we never will, as long as serious cases are tried by juries who simply say “Guilty” or “Not guilty”.

An interesting argument on a fundamental structural flaw in the British justice system.

The system lacks a mechanism to adequately review the safety of the conviction on its merits. As long as the form of the trial is legally perfect, the substance of the jury’s decision remains unassailable, regardless of whether it is actually correct.

Undisclosed Principals and the Construction of Identity: White Rock v Middle Volga [2025] ✎

Can a claimant invoke the doctrine of the undisclosed principal to bind a foreign defendant to a contract that expressly warrants that defendant’s non-existence? In White Rock Corporation Ltd v Middle Volga Shipping Company [2025] EWHC 2089 (Comm), the High Court gave a resounding no. The decision serves as a trenchant affirmation that the identity of a contracting party is a matter of construction, as well as presumption, particularly where sanctions clauses define the commercial reality of the bargain.

The Claimant, White Rock (the Charterers), brought a US$12.6 million claim for wrongful withdrawal of vessels under a time charterparty. The claim targeted two defendants: Middle Volga, a Russian registered owner, and North Global, a Turkish company named as “Disponent Owner”. Seeking to anchor the claim against the Russian entity in London, White Rock contended that North Global had acted merely as an agent for Middle Volga, the alleged undisclosed principal. Middle Volga challenged the jurisdiction, denying it was a party to the contract. 

Mr Peter MacDonald Eggers KC (sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court) upheld the challenge. He ruled that the Claimant had failed to establish the requisite “good arguable case” that Middle Volga was the true principal. 

The Undisclosed Principal Doctrine

The judgment reinforces the heavy evidentiary burden facing any party seeking to look behind the face of a written contract. The Deputy Judge grounded his analysis in the “strong presumption” identified by Leggatt J (as he then was) in The Magellan Spirit [2016] EWHC 454 (Comm) where a party signs a contract in their own name, they are prima facie the principal (at [80]). This conclusion aligns with the line of authority traceable to Humble v Hunter (1848), which established that the doctrine of the undisclosed principal cannot be invoked where it would contradict the express description of the parties in the written instrument.

This presumption is not merely a procedural hurdle; it is a substantive bulwark of commercial certainty. In the faceless world of international shipping, where counterparties frequently transact at arm’s length without meeting, the written instrument is the sole repository of the bargain. As the Court observed, displacing the named party requires “convincing proof” that they were authorised to, and did in fact, act as an agent (at [80]). To hold otherwise would be to invite commercial chaos, allowing parties to evade liability or manufacture jurisdiction by retrospectively attributing the contract to a shadow entity.

The “Russia Clause” and Russian shadow fleet

However, the most interesting aspect of the decision lies in its treatment of the “sanctions warranty” as a tool of construction. The charterparty contained an express warranty: “Owners Confirm that The Vessels Has No Connection with Russia ...”.

White Rock’s submission - that Middle Volga (a Russian entity) was the true “Owner” - entailed a fatal paradox. It required the Court to construe the contract in a manner that rendered it self-contradictory. If Middle Volga were the undisclosed principal, the warranty of “no Russian connection” would have been breached at the exact moment of its formation.

The Court rightly recoiled from such a construction. Adopting an objective approach, the Judge reasoned that rational commercial parties could not have intended to contract with a Russian principal while simultaneously warranting that no such link existed (at [86]). The “Russia Clause” thus functioned not only as a performance obligation but as an identifier of the counterparty. The doctrine of the undisclosed principal cannot be used to contradict the express terms of the agreement.

Supply Chains and the Boundaries of Negligence: Limbu v Dyson [2024] ✎

Can a UK domiciled company be held liable in negligence for the acts of an independent foreign supplier? In Limbu v Dyson Technology Limited [2024] EWCA Civ 1564, the Court of Appeal refused to stay proceedings brought by migrant workers alleging forced labour at a Malaysian factory supplying the Defendant. The issue was not whether the Claimants had a valid case, but where that case should be heard on Spiliada principles: the courts of England or Malaysia.

The Claimants were employed by ATA Industrial, a Malaysian supplier of components to Dyson. They alleged false imprisonment, assault, and dangerous working conditions. Crucially, ATA was not a subsidiary of Dyson; the relationship was purely contractual. Dyson, however, enforced a strict “Ethical and Environmental Code of Conduct” and a “Migrant Worker Policy”, monitored by regular audits.

The Court of Appeal (Popplewell LJ, with whom Sir Geoffrey Vos MR and Warby LJ agreed) held that the case must proceed in England. The judgment represents a significant, if provisional, extension of the Vedanta principle from corporate groups to contractual supply chains.

The Supply Chain Extension (Liability Beyond the Subsidiary)

The central doctrinal development lies in the extension of Vedanta. Traditionally, the “parent company duty of care” has been confined to the structure of corporate groups. However, Popplewell LJ accepted that the logic of Vedanta and Okpabi rests not on shareholding, but on “operational reality” (at [18]).

The Claimants relied on “Routes 2, 3 and 4” of the Okpabi framework: that Dyson had intervened in the management of the supplier’s operations (Route 2), promulgated group-wide safety policies (Route 3), and held itself out as supervising them (Route 4). By mandating the “method” of employment practices and auditing compliance, Dyson had arguably inserted itself into the chain of causation. If its policies were defective, or its audits negligently performed, it could be liable.

While the Court acknowledged this was a “novel issue” in both English and Malaysian law (at [71]), it held the argument was plausible enough to go to trial. This conclusion creates a paradox for multinational compliance. The judgment suggests that a company which adopts an “interventionist” model over that specific risk - actively training and auditing suppliers - risks assuming a duty of care. Conversely, a company which adopts a “tick-box” approach - merely requiring suppliers to warrant compliance or sign a waiver in that respect - might successfully divest itself from the requisite “control”. There is a danger that this developing jurisprudence may generate a perverse incentive, encouraging corporations to distance themselves operationally from their supply chains to insulate themselves from liability. After all, a multinational corporation may have thousands of suppliers; how many compliance officers can they employ?

The Undertakings Battle (the Access to Justice Shield)

The decision is equally significant for its treatment of the second limb of Spiliada: whether the claimant faces a real risk of a denial of justice abroad. In Vedanta, a key reason the case stayed in England was “access to justice” - i.e. the claimants were too impoverished to fund a case in Zambia, and conditional fee agreements (CFAs/“no win, no fee”) were illegal there. Given that Malaysian lawyers might take the case on a partial CFA, and they were similarly impoverished; the Claimants faced an insurmountable funding deficit.

To bridge this “justice” gap, Dyson offered “unprecedented” undertakings, agreeing to pay for the Claimants’ interpreters, court fees, and remote technology costs. The High Court accepted these as sufficient. Popplewell LJ robustly disagreed, identifying two fatal flaws in the proposal.

First, the “paymaster” conflict. The undertakings allowed Dyson to vet costs for “reasonableness”. This would force Claimants to justify their expenditure to their adversary, potentially revealing privileged strategy. As Popplewell LJ observed, a litigant cannot be expected to seek funding approval from the very party they are suing (at [50]).

Second, the problem of incompleteness. Litigation is inherently unpredictable. The undertakings were calibrated to the current case management plan but failed to account for the “known unknowns” - interlocutory applications, unilateral experts, or procedural delays. Consequently, there remained a “real risk” that the Claimants would exhaust their funding mid-trial.

The judgment suggests that the bar for such “remedial justice” undertakings is set exceptionally high. To survive the scrutiny of the courts, a defendant seeking to displace an English forum may need to appoint an independent third party (such as independent solicitors or an escrow agent) to administer the funds, thereby removing the “paymaster” conflict. Furthermore, nothing short of an uncapped indemnity is likely to satisfy the court that the risk of a funding shortfall has been eliminated. Without such robust mechanisms, the “access to justice” argument remains a potent shield for claimants seeking to anchor cross-border disputes in England.

Price “To Be Fixed” vs. “To Be Agreed”: KSY Juice v Citrosuco [2025] ✎

Is a long-term commercial contract enforceable where the price for the majority of the goods is left “to be fixed” by the parties? In KSY Juice Blends UK Ltd v Citrosuco GMBH [2025] EWCA Civ 760, the Court of Appeal considered the boundary between a open-price contract and an “agreement to agree.”

The contract specified a fixed price for 400 metric tonnes (MT) of product per year. However, for an additional 800 MT per year, the contract stated the price was “to be fixed” periodically. When the market price for the product dropped, the Buyer stopped taking delivery of the additional 800 MT. They argued that because the price was never agreed upon, that portion of the contract was a mere “agreement to agree” and therefore legally unenforceable.

The Court of Appeal (Zacaroli LJ, with whom Popplewell and Baker LJJ agreed) held the contract enforceable in its entirety.

“To be Fixed”: Machinery v. Condition Precedent

The Court’s analysis turned on the distinction between a condition of formation and the machinery of performance. Zacaroli LJ correctly rejected the High Court’s conflation of “to be fixed” with “to be agreed.” The phrase “to be agreed” explicitly requires the future consensus of the parties, attracting the strictures of May & Butcher. By contrast, “to be fixed” describes an outcome - that a price will be established - without prescribing a specific method (i.e. mutual agreement).

This distinction is sound. Where, as here, the parties have acted upon a long-term relationship and the intention to be bound is manifest, the silence as to the method of fixing the price is not fatal. It creates a gap which the law can fill, in line with Hillas and Mamidoil.

The High Court’s rigid application of May & Butcher ignored the distinction between the negotiation phase and the performance phase. The parties were not negotiating; they were performing a signed deal. To permit a party to treat a “price to be fixed” clause as an option to withdraw whenever the market moves against them would be to sanction a breach of contract under the guise of uncertainty.

Commercial Efficacy

The judgment affirms the robust approach of the English courts to commercial certainty. As Zacaroli LJ observed, the “to be fixed” clause was merely the mechanism for adjusting the consideration for an existing obligation. By invoking the “reasonable price” mechanism, the Court gave effect to the parties’ objective intention to trade, privileging commercial substance over the technical gaps.

Supreme Court on Police Negligence and Public Duty: Tindall v Chief Constable of Thames Valley Police [2024] ✎

The police generally owe no duty to protect individuals from harm caused by third parties or natural hazards. This strict rule, restated in Michael, remains good law. However, in Tindall v Chief Constable of Thames Valley Police [2024] UKSC 33, the Supreme Court has provided a salutary clarification of the doctrinal uncertainty surrounding “ineffectual interventions” exception.

The facts were tragic. A driver, Mr. Kendall, lost control on black ice. Uninjured, he began signaling to approaching traffic. Police officers attended, cleared debris, and erected a warning sign. However, upon clearing the debris, they removed the sign and departed, leaving the ice exactly as dangerous as they found it. Shortly thereafter, another driver hit the ice and crashed, killing himself and a third party, Mr. Tindall.

The claimant argued that by taking control of the scene and then abandoning it, the police had assumed a duty of care. The Supreme Court disagreed. Lord Leggatt and Lord Burrows (delivering the unanimous judgment) reaffirming the rule in Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales [2015] UKSC 2, the Court held that liability arises only where the authority has created the danger or made matters worse than if they had never attended at all.

The Interference Principle

Lord Leggatt’s judgment is notable for its compelling articulation of the “interference principle” (from McBride & Bagshaw). This establishes that an authority acts with actionable misfeasance if its conduct actively worsens the victim’s position, either by creating a new peril or by disabling an alternative source of rescue.

His Lordship accepted that there is no logical distinction between turning off a protective device (as in the sprinklers in Capital & Counties plc v Hampshire County Council [1997] Q.B. 1004) and sending away a rescuer (as in OLL Ltd v Secretary of State for Transport [1997] 3 All E.R. 897, where the Coastguard misdirected a Navy helicopter). In both instances, the intervention transforms a passive failure into one of active harm.

This synthesis brings welcome clarity to the “misleading assurances” line of authority. As Lord Leggatt observed (at [53]), cases like Kent v Griffiths [2001] QB 36 and Darnley v Croydon Health Services NHS Trust [2018] UKSC 50, are properly understood not as exceptions to the omissions rule, but as examples of positive acts: the provision of misinformation is an active intervention that foreseeably causes physical injury. This is apposite since public authorities “monopolise” a rescue, and by regarding it as a positive act, the Supreme Court has provided a conceptual tool that converts what appears to be a passive failure into actionable harm. It is submitted that this approach is conceptually sound; it prevents the anomalous result where an authority could demand bystanders stand back, fail to assist, and then claim it  “did nothing”.

Activity as a Whole

Crucially, Lord Leggatt held that the law must look at “the activity as a whole” (at [45]). This contextual approach prevents the artificial “slicing” of conduct by a public authority.

Once a positive act is initiated, the entire intervention is treated as a single unit. Consequently, any subsequent negligent omission, in its execution, becomes part of a positive course of conduct. It is submitted that this is a principled position; it recognises that an authority cannot escape liability for a danger it has effectively managed and then mismanaged. It also represents a shift back to the negligence orthodoxy re-established by Lord Reed in Robinson [2018] UKSC 4 against granting public immunity where a duty of care clearly exists on established principles.

Incompetence is not Interference

Finally, the judgment draws a necessary distinction between “incompetence” and “interference”. Lord Leggatt distinguished between “failing to confer a benefit” and displacing an existing protection (at [44] and [56]).

With respect to an “incompetence”, Lord Leggatt reasoned (applying the principle in East Suffolk Rivers Catchment Board v Kent [1941] AC 74) that an authority is protected from liability if it merely fails to improve a situation relative to the baseline of “no rescue”. Incompetence (marked by a failure to make matters better) is not a tort. Conversely, a true interference arises where the authority’s intervention leaves the victim worse off than the “no rescue” baseline (e.g., by stopping Mr. Kendall’s warnings). 

It is correct that the law maintains this strict policy. In Tindall, the police were merely incompetent (non-legal sense) for failing to keep the sign up; they did not make the ice worse than it was before they arrived. To hold otherwise would encourage “defensive policing”, deterring officers from responding to unclear risks for fear that any partial or ineffectual attempt to help would attract immediate litigation.

Supreme Court on Deemed Fulfilment: King Crude Carriers v Ridgebury [2025] ✎

The Supreme Court has finally excised a long-standing anomaly from English contract law. In King Crude Carriers SA & Ors v Ridgebury November LLC & Ors [2025] UKSC 39, Lord Hamblen (with whom Lord Burrows and the other Justices agreed) held that the principle of “deemed fulfilment”, derived from the Scottish case of Mackay v Dick (1881) 6 App. Cas. 251, forms no part of the English common law. 

Ridgebury agreed to sell crude carriers to King Crude, with a 10% deposit to be lodged in a joint escrow account. The deposit obligation was subject to a condition precedent: the successful opening of that account. The Buyers breached the contract by failing to provide the necessary documentation, rendering the condition impossible to satisfy. Following the Buyers’ failure to complete, the Sellers sought to recover the deposit as a debt rather than claiming damages. This was a tactical necessity: the market value of the vessels had risen, meaning the Sellers had suffered no financial loss. On Golden Victory principles, damages would be nominal. The Sellers were therefore forced to argue that the condition of opening the account should be “deemed fulfilled” because the Buyers had wrongfully prevented it.

The End of a Legal Fiction

Lord Hamblen was plainly right to reject the Mackay v Dick principle as a fiction (at [66]). The concept of deemed fulfilment, which treats an unfulfilled condition as satisfied where one party prevents its performance, originates from Lord Watson’s dicta in Mackay. However, as Lord Hamblen noted, Lord Watson was a Scottish judge applying a concept from Bell’s Principles and Roman law to a Scottish appeal. It is a distinctly alien concept that has sat uncomfortably within the English common law for over a century.

The Supreme Court instead preferred the analysis of Lord Blackburn in Mackay, which viewed the issue through the lens of proper contractual construction, specifically, a condition subsequent with an implied duty of cooperation (at [26]). Lord Hamblen’s reasoning is principled and compelling: “fictions tend to obscure transparent reasoning and, wherever possible, should be removed.” Relying on such fictions is untenable; it prevents the court from analysing the actual terms of the bargain and the true measure of loss. The decision serves as a necessary warning that civil law concepts should only be permitted where they sit harmoniously with existing common law precepts.

Narrowing the Prevention Principle

The judgment is also significant for its treatment of the “prevention principle”, the maxim that a party should not benefit from their own wrong. Lord Hamblen distinguished between the “presumption” in Chitty regarding this maxim and a prescriptive universal rule. Expressly invoking the theory of efficient breach (at [78]), his Lordship reaffirmed that contract law is concerned with compensation, not punishment.

This robust defence of the underlying principles of contract law is welcome. It is plausible that the prevention principle was the “moral” engine that kept the deemed fulfilment doctrine alive in English law for 145 years, despite its technical flaws. For instance, in Companie Noga d'Importation et d'Exportation SA v Abacha (No 3) [2002] CLC 207, Rix LJ was faced with a settlement agreement where a debtor sought to evade a large financial obligation by blocking the conditions. It is arguable that Rix LJ viewed the debt itself as the “true” bargain, using the prevention principle as a deterrent to enforce that bargain. Abacha has now been rightly overruled.

Lord Hamblen clarified that the prevention maxim is limited in two respects. First, it has a narrow defensive application; it cannot be used as a sword to create new contractual rights or “kill” a contract. In King Crude, the Buyers were using the contract as a shield, insisting on the correct legal remedy (damages) rather than the one the Sellers preferred (debt). Second, applying the modern approach to interpretation in Arnold v Britton and Wood v Capita, the literal contextual analysis showed the parties had agreed to a strict condition for the debt.

The decision brings welcome clarity to the distinction between a claim for damages and a claim in debt. By preventing the maxim from being used to rewrite the bargain, the Supreme Court has reasserted the paramountcy of the contractual text. As Lord Hamblen noted, sophisticated parties have only themselves to blame for ostensibly “unreasonable and absurd consequences” (at [81]).